The civil rights movement suffered many defeats in the first half of the twentieth century. Repeated efforts to obtain passage of federal anti-lynching bills failed. The all-white primary system, which effectively disenfranchised southern blacks, resisted numerous court challenges. The Depression worsened conditions on farms and in ghettos. On the positive side, the growing political power of blacks in northern cities and an increasing liberal trend in the Supreme Court portended the legal and legislative victories of the 1950s and 1960s.
A great deal of the civil rights struggle throughout this
period was carried on by the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), which had begun chipping away at the roots of legalized
segregation in a series of successful lawsuits. A major breakthrough for
the NAACP came in 1954 when the United States Supreme Court ruled in Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka that discrimination in education was unconstitutional.
This decision was as momentous as the Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy
v. Ferguson in 1896, which legalized the doctrine of "separate but equal"
treatment for blacks.
The Brown case involved the practice of
denying black children equal access to state public schools due to state
laws requiring or permitting racial segregation. The United States Supreme
Court unanimously held that segregation deprived the children ofequal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
Beginning in the late 1930s, the United States Supreme Court began to review numerous cases dealing with segregation in public education; by the 1950s it had become evident that segregated educational facilities were not equal.
In 1938, ruling in the case Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada , the Court ruled that states were required to provide equal educational facilities for blacks within its boundaries. (The state of Missouri at that time had maintained a practice of providing funds for blacks to attend graduate and professional schools outside of the state, rather than provide facilities itself.) Taking an even greater step, in 1950 the Court in Sweatt v. Painter ruled that a separate law school for blacks provided by the state of Texas violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . In 1952, five different cases, all dealing with segregation in public schools but with different facts and from different places, reached the United States Supreme Court. Four of the cases, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (out of Kansas), Briggs v. Elliott (out of South Carolina), Davis v. Prince Edward County School Board (out of Virginia), and Gebhart v. Belton (out of Delaware) were considered together; the fifth case, Bolling v. Sharpe, coming out of the District of Columbia, was considered separately (since the district is not a state). After hearing initial arguments, the Court found itself unable to reach an agreement. In 1953, the Court heard reargument.Thurgood Marshall , legal consul for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Education Fund, presented arguments on behalf of the black students. On May 17, 1954, the Court unanimously ruled that segregation in all public education deprived minority children of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (In the Bolling case, the Court determined that segregation violated provisions of the Fifth Amendment, since the Fourteenth Amendment is expressly directed to the states.)
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(Note: I have deleted some sections of the Supreme Court ruling)
Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court
In each of these cases, minors of the Negro race, through
their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission
to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each
instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children
under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This
segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other
than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief
to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced
by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson (excerpts)
. ....Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded
when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though
these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of
Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted
to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated school public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctive among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson..., involving not education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming v. County Board of Education... and Gong Lum v. Rice..., the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. In none of these cases [Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents] was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter..., the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teacher, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter in finding that a segregated
law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities,
this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable
of objective measurement but which make for greatness in the law school."
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents... the Court, in requiring
that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other
students, again resorted to intangible considerations: "...his ability
to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students,
and, in general, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with
added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect
of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by
a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled
to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plesssy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply
supported by modern authority. Any languages in Plessy v. Ferguson
contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and other similarly situated for whom the actions have brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question--the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.
It is so ordered.
Source: Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 United States Supreme Court Reports 483 (1954).
Upon their arrival for classes on September 23, 1957, black students were turned away by the Arkansas National Guard on the order of Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus. President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded to the crisis, issuing an executive order on September 24 which called for the use of federal troops to enforce the Court's order to desegregate public schools.
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Whereas certain persons in the State of Arkansas, individually and in unlawful assemblages, combinations, and conspiracies, have wilfully obstructed the enforcement of orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas with respect to matters relating to enrollment and attendance at public schools, particularly at Central High School, located in Little Rock School District, Little Rock, Arkansas; and
Whereas such wilful obstruction of justice hinders the execution of the laws of that State and of the United States, and makes it impracticable to enforce such laws by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; and
Whereas such obstruction of justice constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution of the United States and impedes the course of justice under those laws;
Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, particularly sections 332, 333 and 334 thereof, do command all persons engaged in such obstruction of justice to cease and desist therefrom, and to disperse forthwith, and
Whereas the command contained in that Proclamation has not been obeyed and wilful obstruction of enforcement of said court orders still exists and threatens to continue:
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10, particularly sections 332, 333 and 334 thereof, and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of Defense to order into the active military service of the United States as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Order, any or all of the units of the National Guard of the United States and of the Air National Guard of the United States within the State of Arkansas to serve in the active military service of the United States for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders.
Section 2. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to take all appropriate steps to enforce any orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas for the removal of obstruction of justice in the State of Arkansas with respect to matters relating to enrollment and attendance at public schools in the Little Rock School District, Little Rock, Arkansas. In carrying out the provisions of this section, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use the units, and members thereof, ordered into the active military service of the United States pursuant to Section 1 of this Order.
Section 3. In furtherance of the enforcement of the aforementioned orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the armed forces of the United States as he may deem necessary.
Section 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to delegate to the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, or both, any of the authority conferred upon him by this Order.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Executive Order No. 10730 (September 24, 1957), 3 Code of Federal Regulations, 1954-1958 Compilation, p. 388.