The recent Taliban capture of Kabul
and control of much of Afghanistan, Hamas's continued threats to disrupt
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, bombing attacks targeting American
military in Saudi Arabia, attacks by Muslim extremists against Christians
in Egypt and the Sudan, the brutal murder of Trappist monks in Algeria,
communal riots from Nigeria to Indonesia between Muslims and Christians
- these are the events associated with Islam that capture headlines and
cause grave concern.
At the same time, Islamic political and social activism have become powerful
institutionalized forces in mainstream society. Islamic candidates have
held cabinet-level positions and been elected parliamentarians, mayors,
and city officials in countries as diverse as Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt,
Sudan, Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan, Yemen, Kuwait, Malaysia, and even Israel.
Secular Turkey has its first Islamist prime minister, Malaysia's deputy
prime minister was the founder of a major Malaysian Islamic movement, and
Bosnia has a president often identified as an Islamist.
Islam has also proved a potent social force in civil society. Islamically
inspired institutions - schools, hospitals, clinics, legal aid societies,
social services, banks, publishing houses - have proliferated. Islamists
have won elections in professional associations from faculty and student
groups to organizations for physicians, lawyers, and engineers.
While there is much that could be written about the positive interaction
and exchanges between Islam and Christianity, the realities of contemporary
politics and the media have produced a different set of issues. Some speak
of a clash of civilizations and a new Crusade, others warn of the dangers
of demonizing this major world religion, and there is the tendency of some
in the post-cold war period to identify Islam as the new global threat.
Ironically, all too often we seek understanding and answers as though we
are inquiring about a "foreign" or alien faith. In fact, Islam is well
on the way to becoming the second largest religion in the United States
and Europe in the twenty-first century. Thus, we are not just talking about
strangers who are Muslims but, in a very real sense, our neighbors as well.
History of Conflict and Misunderstanding
Despite many common theological roots
and beliefs, Muslim-Christian relations have often been overshadowed by
conflict as the armies and missionaries of Islam and of Christendom have
been locked in a struggle for power and for souls: from the fall of the
Byzantine (eastern Roman) Empire before Muslim armies in the seventh century
to the Crusades during the eleventh and twelfth centuries; the expulsion
of the "Moors" from Spain and the Inquisition; the Ottoman threat to overrun
Europe; European (Christian) colonial expansion and domination from the
eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries; the political and cultural
challenge of the superpowers in a period of "neocolonialism" during the
latter half of the twentieth century; the creation of the state of Israel
by Western "Christian" countries and consequent Palestinian exile; the
competition of Christian and Muslim missionaries today, from Africa to
Southeast Asia; and the contemporary reassertion of Islam in politics around
the world.
Ironically, the very theological similarities of Christianity and Islam
had put the two on an early collision course. Both religions had a universal
message and mission. Both possessed a supercessionist theology; that is,
each community believed that its covenant with God was the fulfillment
of God's earlier revelation to a previous community that had gone astray.
While Christians had little problem with their supercessionist views toward
Judaism, a similar claim by Muslims to have the final revelation was unacceptable
and, more than that, a threat to the uniqueness and divinely mandated role
of Christianity to be the only means to salvation.
Christendom experienced the early conquests and expansion of Islam as a
theological, political, and civilizational challenge to its religious and
political hegemony. Muslim rule, and with it the message of Islam, quickly
spread from the Byzantine and Persian Empires to Syria, Iraq, and Egypt,
and swept across North Africa and into Europe where Muslims ruled Spain
and the Mediterranean from Sicily to Anatolia.
Non-Muslims in the Islamic State
For non-Muslim populations in Byzantium
and Persia, who were subjugated to foreign rulers, Islamic rule meant an
exchange of rulers rather than a loss of independence. Many in Byzantium
willingly exchanged Greco-Roman rule for new Arab masters - fellow Semites
- with whom they had closer linguistic and cultural affinities. Christians
and Jews were regarded as "People of the Book" (those who had possessed
a scripture/revelation from God). In exchange for allegiance to the state
and payment of a poll (head) tax, these "protected" (dhim-mi) peoples could
practice their faith and be governed by their religious leaders and law
in matters of faith and private life (family laws).
Thus, Islam proved more tolerant than imperial Christianity, providing
greater religious freedom for Jews and indigenous Christians; most local
Christian churches had been persecuted as schismatics and heretics by a
"foreign" Christian orthodoxy. As Francis E. Peters, writing about the
early Muslim empires, has observed:
The conquests destroyed little: what they did suppress were imperial rivalries
and sectarian bloodletting among the newly subjected population. The Muslims
tolerated Christianity but they disestablished it; henceforth Christian
life and liturgy, its endowments, politics, and theology, would be a private
not a public affair. By an exquisite irony, Islam reduced the status of
Christians to that which the Christians had earlier thrust upon the Jews,
with one difference. The reduction in Christian status was merely judicial;
it was unaccompanied by either systematic persecution or blood lust, and
generally, though not everywhere and at all times, unmarred by vexatious
behavior.
The rapid spread and development of imperial Islam produced a rich Islamic
civilization, which reflected religious and cultural synthesis and exchange.
With significant assistance from Christian and Jewish subjects, Muslims
collected the great books of science, medicine, and philosophy from the
West and the East and translated them into Arabic from Greek, Latin, Persian,
Coptic, Syriac, and Sanskrit. The age of translation was followed by a
period of great creativity as a new generation of educated Muslim thinkers
and scientists made their own contributions to learning: in philosophy,
medicine, chemistry, astronomy, algebra, optics, art, and architecture.
The cultural traffic pattern was again reversed when Europeans, emerging
from the Dark Ages, turned to Muslim centers of learning to regain their
lost heritage and to learn from Muslim advances in philosophy, mathematics,
medicine, and science.
From the Crusades to European Colonialism
Few events have had a more shattering
and long-lasting effect on Muslim-Christian relations than the Crusades.
For many in the West, the specific facts regarding the Crusades are but
a dim memory. Few remember that it was the pope who called for the Crusades,
and that on balance the Crusaders lost. For Muslims, the memory of the
Crusades lives on as the clearest example of militant Christianity, an
early harbinger of the aggression and imperialism of the Christian West.
If many in the West have regarded Islam as a religion of the sword, Muslims
through the ages speak of the Christian West's crusader mentality and hegemonic
ambitions.
For Muslim-Christian relations, it is less a case of what actually happened
in the Crusades than how they are remembered. Each community looks back
with memories of its commitment to defend its faith and with heroic stories
of valor and chivalry against "the infidel." Both Muslims and Christians
saw the other as militant, somewhat barbaric, and fanatic in religious
zeal, determined to conquer, convert, or eradicate the other, and thus
an enemy of God.
A second far-reaching and influential event affecting the relationship
of Islam to the West is the experience of European colonialism. Its impact
and continued legacy remain alive in Middle East politics and throughout
the Muslim world today. No one who has traveled in and studied the Muslim
world can be oblivious to the tendency of many Muslims to associate their
past and current problems in large part with the legacy of European colonialism.
European colonialism abruptly reversed a pattern of self-rule that had
existed from the time of the Prophet. The vast majority of the Muslim community
had possessed a sense of history in which Islam had, over the centuries,
remained triumphant, and Muslims lived under Muslim rule. As the balance
of power and leadership shifted to Europe, much of the Muslim world found
itself either directly ruled or dominated by the Christian West, threatened
by "crown and cross." On the other hand, many Europeans believed that modernity
was not only the result of conditions producing the Enlightenment and the
Industrial Revolution, but also due to the inherent superiority of Christianity
as a religion and culture. The British spoke of the "white man's burden"
and the French of their "mission to civilize" as they colonized much of
Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.
The external threat to Muslim identity and autonomy from European Christendom
raised profound religious as well as political questions for many in the
Muslim world: What had gone wrong? Why had Muslim fortunes been so thoroughly
reversed? Was it Muslims who had failed Islam, or Islam that had failed
Muslims? How were Muslims to respond?
Western Neocolonialism and the Islamic Resurgence
The creation of Israel and the politics
of the cold war were regarded as signs of a new colonialism in the post-World
War II period, a hegemonic chess game between the United States and the
Soviet Union that threatened the identity and integrity of the Muslim world.
Israel was considered a European/American colony in the midst of the Arab
nation. For Arab leaders, Palestine provided a cause that they could exploit
to buttress their power domestically and internationally. The struggle
against Israel symbolized the battle against imperialism, provided a common
cause and sense of unity, and distracted from the failures of many regimes.
Both the secular and the religiously oriented - Arab nationalists and Islamic
activists-found common ground in their focus on liberating Palestine, the
great jihad ("struggle," holy war) against Western imperialism.
The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 focused attention on "Islamic fundamentalism"
and with it the spread of political Islam in other parts of the Muslim
world. However, this contemporary revival had its origins and roots in
the late 1960s and early 1970s in such disparate areas as Egypt and Libya
as well as Pakistan and Malaysia. The ongoing failures of many of these
countries' economies, the growing disparities between rich and poor, corruption,
and the general impact and disruption of modernity spawned disillusionment
and a sense of failure within modern Muslim states. In addition, American
ignorance of and hostility toward Islam and the Middle East, often seen
by Muslims as a "Christian Crusader" mentality influenced by Orientalism
and Zionism, were blamed for misguided U.S. political-military policies:
support for an "un-Islamic," authoritarian Shah of Iran, massive military
and economic funding of Israel, and the backing of an "unrepresentative"
Christian-controlled government in Lebanon. These crises reinforced a prevailing
sense of impotence and inferiority among many Muslims, the product of centuries
of European colonial dominance that left a legacy of admiration (of the
West's power, science, and technology) as well as deep resentment (of its
dominance, penetration, and exploitation).
For Islamic political activists, Islam is a total or comprehensive way
of life as revealed in the Qur'an, God's Word, mirrored in the example
of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Muslim community-state, and embodied
in the Shariah, Islamic law. Thus, for Islamists the renewal and revitalization
of governments and societies require the restoration or reimplementation
of Islamic law, which is the blueprint for an Islamically guided and socially
just state and society. While Islamists reject the Westernization and secularization
of society, modernization through science and technology is accepted. However,
the pace, direction, and extent of change should, they believe, be subordinated
to Islamic belief and values, so that the penetration and excessive dependence
on Western values can be avoided.
In the 1990s, Islamic revivalism has developed from small radical groups
or organizations on the periphery of society to a significant part of mainstream
Muslim society. This "quiet revolution" has produced a new class of modern,
educated, but Islamically oriented elites and organizations that exist
alongside their secular counterparts. They have become part and parcel
of mainstream religion and society, found among the middle and lower classes,
educated and uneducated, professionals and workers, young and old, men,
women, and children. A new generation of Islamically oriented leaders may
be found in Egypt, the Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, Iran, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Yemen, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
Islam & the West: Challenge or Threat?
According to some, Islam and the
West are on a political, demographic, and religio-cultural collision course.
Past images of a Christian West turning back threatening Muslim armies
are conjured up and linked to current political as well as demographic
realities. Immigrants and immigration have become an explosive political
issue in Europe and. America.
If the 1980s were dominated by fear of "other Irans" or of underground
terrorist groups, the emergence of Islam's "quiet revolution" has increased
fears of political Islam. Its global force is now seen not only in the
Islamic Republics of Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan, but also in the emergence
of Islamists as effective political and social actors in Turkey, Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Governments in the Middle East, both Arab states and Israel, play on such
fears, warning of the dangers of "fundamentalism," domestically and internationally.
Often their appeals conveniently obscure their own domestic political,
economic, and social problems and causes for opposition and instability.
The "fundamentalist" threat, described monolithically and equated solely
with radicalism and terrorism, becomes a convenient pretext for crushing
political opposition, nonviolent as well as violent, and backing away from
previous commitments to democratization or greater political participation.
For example, Tunisia's Zeine Abedin Ben Ali used such an excuse to "decapitate"
his Islamic opposition (the Renaissance party which had emerged as the
leading opposition in elections), as well as to silence secular opposition
and thus win the elections of 1993 with 99.91 percent of the vote. With
the end of the cold war and the threat of communism, a similar mission
with a new threat, "Islamic fundamentalism," has become a primary excuse
for Israel and Egypt to attract foreign aid or excuse human rights records
of abuses. Fear of fundamentalists coming to power has often influenced
European and American attitudes toward Turkey, Bosnia, Chechniya, Central
Asia and, more broadly, the promotion of democratization in the Muslim
world.
At the same time the record of Islamic experiments in Iran, Sudan, Pakistan,
and, most recently, Afghanistan has reinforced fears of the export of terrorism.
Reports of the forced veiling and seclusion of women, militant attacks
against Christians in Egypt and Sudan, and discrimination against the Bahai
in Iran and the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan exacerbate concerns about the rights
of women and minorities. While many modern Muslim states granted equality
of citizenship to all regardless of religious faith, the contemporary resurgence
has resurrected pressures to reimplement classical Islamic laws which inform
traditional attitudes and values that have remained operative in the minds
and outlooks of many traditionally minded Muslims. Legal change implemented
or imposed from the top down by a minority elite has not in many cases
significantly changed popular culture and values.
In recent years, there are those who speak of a clash of civilizations,
a clash between Islam and "our" modern secular (or Judaeo-Christian) democratic
values and culture. Those who contrast Islamic civilization or culture
with "our" modern Western culture conveniently slip into an "us and them"
mentality that obscures the diversity of both sides, and implies a "static,
retrogressive them" and a "dynamic, progressive us." Several things should
be kept in mind. The history of religions demonstrates that all three Abrahamic
faiths (as indeed all religions) change; the issue is not change but degrees
of change. All three traditions have within them divergent orientations:
orthodox, conservative, reformist, fundamentalist, "secularist," etc. Judaism
and Christianity, responding to pressing modern political, social, economic
or cultural challenges/realities, experienced their reformations, but with
diverse responses that continue to be reflected in their differing communities.
For example, think of the vast diversity that exists between Orthodox and
Reform Jews, Southern Baptist and Unitarian Christians on issues ranging
from evolution to abortion.
Islam is experiencing, sometimes in similar and sometimes in dissimilar
ways, the tensions and conflicts that accompany the interactions between
tradition and change. The West, and Judaism and Christianity, experienced
centuries-long struggles as a result of the political revolutions that
accompanied the emergence of modern states and societies to the Reformation
(which included warfare as well as theological disputation). Islam and
Muslim communities have been severely limited by a lack of freedom and
autonomy, first because of European colonialism and more recently, in many
countries, by authoritarian governments. As with the Western experience,
this political, social, and religio-cultural reformation or revolution
is at times one of radical change whose experiments and progress can in
the short term degenerate into violent revolution and radicalism, provoked
by both political and religious authoritarianism and demagoguery.
Most Muslims are not Islamic political activists. In fact, such activists
constitute only a minority, albeit a significant minority. Moreover, we
must distinguish between a violent minority, bent upon the overthrow of
governments, and a majority that, given the opportunity, will work within
the system to bring about change. Even more difficult, of course, is distinguishing
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence. When are revolutions
just? When is violence or warfare defensive rather than offensive? When
is it just or unjust?
Islam in the West
The remarkable growth of Islam in
Europe and America, where it is now the second- or third-largest religion,
has raised fears about whether Muslims can be loyal citizens and even whether
they will bring "fundamentalist" violence to the West. The World Trade
Center bombing as well as bombings in Paris and France help to feed such
fears. France has insisted on integration, not multiculturalism. Muslims
have experienced levels of discrimination in society and the media in Europe
and America that would simply, not be tolerated by Christians and Jews.
Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, is a religion that provides a framework
of faith and meaning that has transformed lives and societies. At the same
time, again like Judaism and Christianity, it has been used or abused to
justify violence and oppression. We can speak equally about militant Judaism
and Christianity as we can about militant Islam. Part of our problem of
interpretation is that when a Jewish extremist murdered Muslims at prayer
in the Hebron mosque or assassinated Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, or when
Christian extremists, calling themselves the army of God, blew up an abortion
clinic, we reflexively distinguished between the mainstream faith of Jews
and Christians and the twisted use of religion by fanatics. Making an equivalent
distinction with regard to Islam does not regularly occur. Similarly, while
some do not object to the mixing of religion and politics in Israel, Eastern
Europe, or Latin America (liberation theology), they will do so in a blanket
way when it comes to Islam.
As Jews faced the challenges of preserving a sense of identity, community,
and faith within an American society dominated by Christian culture and
values, Muslims today as a religious minority face a similar challenge
within a Judaeo-Christian or secular America. Real understanding can begin
when we, the majority, come to realize that, despite our differences, there
is a common Judaeo-Christian-Islamic heritage shared by all the children
of Abraham, and that Islam is not a "foreign" or Middle Eastern religion
any more than Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim presence in America
spans centuries, not decades, and with a population of at least from 4
to 6 million, Muslims are indeed "us." The failures of our educational
system to make us aware of these facts and our media's presentation of
present Islam and Muslims only through "headline events" have distorted
or obscured these realities.
Conclusion
This is an exceptionally dynamic
and fluid period in Muslim history. Diverse voices in the Muslim world
are grappling with issues from scriptural criticism and exegesis, modernism,
democracy, and pluralism to women's rights and family values. The voices
for substantive change are a minority and themselves divided, much as was
the case, for example, in Roman Catholicism in the late nineteenth and
the first half of the twentieth century regarding modernism, pluralism,
biblical criticism, and dissent. The days of excommunication, silencing,
or banishment, the index of forbidden books, the easy consignment of "others"
to hell, the struggle between the religious establishment and the laity
may be in large part gone, but are not all that far behind us. For Muslims,
who struggle with similar problems in many societies where political participation
and freedom of expression have been restricted, and authoritarianism, patriarchy,
and violence all too common, the battle can be especially contentious.
The fundamental question or issue for contemporary Muslims, one which affects
Muslim-Christian relations as well, is the direction of Islamic revival
or reform. Will it simply be a process of restoration of classical law,
or will it be one of reformation: a reformulation of Islamic law that distinguishes
between the immutable and the mutable, between that which is divine and
that which is the product of human interpretation? For believers everywhere,
this is an all-too-familiar question.
Contemporary Islam challenges us all to know and understand the richness
and diversity of the Muslim experience. Followers of Christianity and Judaism
are specifically challenged to recall or to become aware of the faith of
Islam, to acknowledge their Muslim brothers and sisters as children of
Abraham. Muslim governments are challenged to be more responsive to popular
demands for political liberalization and greater popular participation,
to tolerate rather than repress opposition movements (including Islamic
organizations and parties), and to build viable, democratic institutions.
At the same time, new Islamic governments and movements are challenged
to demonstrate by word and action that they acknowledge the rights of others,
that pluralism and human rights are not valued only when Muslims seek access
to power but also when they are in power. Self-criticism and the denunciation
of religious extremism, intolerance, and authoritarianism are the only
means by which Islamist claims can be credible.
Western powers are challenged to stand by the democratic values they embody
and to recognize authentic populist movements and the right of the people
to determine the nature of their governments and leadership, whether they
choose a secular or a more Islamically oriented path.
And finally, as Christians and Jews, or their secular counterparts, view
the changing specter of Islam, they need to remember their own histories.
Moreover, they must seek to understand before they judge, not to excuse,
but to be sure that their judgments, which have implications both internationally
and domestically, are fair and informed.
John L. Esposito
is professor of religion and international affairs and director of the
Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. Editor-in-chief
of The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modem Islamic World, Esposito's
other publications include The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?
and Islam: The Straight Path (all Oxford University Press).
Seidnaya is a Greek Orthodox convent in Syria, three hours' walk from Damascus. The monastery sits on a great crag of rock overlooking the orchards and olive groves of the Damascene plain.
According to legend the monastery was founded in the early sixth century, after the Byzantine emperor Justinian chased a stag on to the top of the hill during a hunting expedition. Just as Justinian was about to draw his bow, the stag changed into the Virgin Mary, who commanded him to build a convent on the top of the rock.
The abbey quickly became a place of pilgrimage and to this day streams of Christian, Muslim and Druze pilgrims trudge their way to Seidnaya from the mountains of Lebanon and the valleys of the Syrian jebel.
When I visited the church at Seidnaya in 1994, it was filled not only with a Christian congregation, but also with Muslim men and their shrouded wives. As the priest circled the altar with his thurible, filling the sanctuary with great clouds of incense, the men bobbed up and down on their prayer mats as if in the middle of Friday prayers in their mosque. Their women, some dressed in full black chador, mouthed prayers from the shadows of the exonarthex. It was truly an extraordinary sight, Christians and Muslims praying together in a fashion unimaginable today almost anywhere else in the Near East. Yet it was, of course, the old way: the eastern Christians and Muslims have lived side by side for nearly one and a half millennia.
Seidnaya is a reminder of the amazing way in which Christians and Muslims had succeeded in living together for so many centuries, in closely knit communities in town after town, village after village across the Middle East. If that coexistence was not always a complete harmony, it was at least, with very few exceptions, a kind of pluralist equilibrium. This is the history that commentators today ignore, as they glibly speak of "Islamic fundamentalism" and "Muslim terror" in the wake of the bombs in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.
It is also a history that has been forgotten across the length of what was once the former Ottoman Empire. Here, with the rise of education, self-consciousness and modern nationalism, the 20th century has unravelled the complex tapestry of pluralism - most recently and painfully in Bosnia, but before that in Cyprus, Palestine, Greece and Turkey. In each of these places pluralism has been replaced by a savage polarisation. In dribs and drabs, and sometimes in great tragic exoduses, religious minorities have fled to places where they can be majorities, and those too few for that have fled the region altogether, seeking out places less heavy in history such as America and Australia. If the 20th century has seen Europe change to a multicultural society, the same period has seen country after country in the Middle East change in the opposite direction, to a series of monolithic monoethnic blocs.
[....]
Today the west often views Islam as a civilisation very different from and indeed innately hostile to Christianity. Only when you travel in Christianity's eastern homelands do you realise how closely the two are connected, the former growing directly out of the latter and still, to this day, embodying many aspects and practices of the early Christian world now lost in Christianity's modern, western-based incarnation. When the early Byzantines were first confronted by the Prophet's armies, they assumed that Islam was merely a heretical form of Christianity, and in many ways they were not so far wrong: Islam accepts much of the Old and New Testaments and venerates both Jesus and the ancient Jewish prophets.
Significantly, the greatest and most subtle theologian of the early church, St John Damascene, was convinced that Islam was, at root, not a separate religion at all. St John had grown up in the Ummayad Arab court of Damascus, where his father was chancellor. Later, in his old age, John took the habit at the desert monastery of Mar Saba where he began work on his great masterpiece, a refutation of heresies entitled the Fount of Knowledge. The book contains a detailed critique of Islam, the first ever written by a Christian, which, intriguingly, John regarded as a form of Christian heresy related to Arianism: after all, Arianism, like Islam, denied the divinity of Christ. Although he lived at the very hub of the early Islamic world, it never seems to have occurred to him that Islam might be a separate religion. That a theologian of the stature of John Damascene was able to regard Islam as a new - if heretical - form of Christianity helps to explain how Islam was able to convert so much of the Middle Eastern population in so short a time, even though Christianity remained the majority religion until the time of the Crusades.
The closer one studies the Christian communities of the Middle East, the more one becomes aware of the extent to which eastern Christian practice formed the template for what were to become the basic conventions of Islam. The Muslim form of prayer with its bowings and prostrations appears to derive from the older Syrian Orthodox tradition that is still practised in pewless churches across the Levant. The architecture of the earliest minarets, which are square rather than round, derive unmistakably from the church towers of Byzantine Syria.
The Sufi Muslim tradition carried on directly from the point that the Christian Desert Fathers left off, while Ramadan - at first sight one of the most foreign and alienating of Islamic practices - is, in fact, nothing more than an Islamicisation of Lent, which in the eastern Christian churches still involves a gruelling all-day fast.
Certainly, if a monk from sixth-century Byzantium were to come back today it is probable that he would find much more that was familiar in the practices and beliefs of a modern Sufi than he would with, say, a contemporary American Evangelical. Yet this simple truth has been lost by our tendency to think of Christianity as a thoroughly western religion rather than the oriental faith which, by origin, it actually is. Moreover, the modern demonisation of Islam in the west - particularly since the second world war and the foundation of the western-backed state of Israel - together with the recent growth of Muslim fundamentalism (itself in many ways a reaction to the west's repeated humiliation of the Muslim word) have led to an atmosphere where few in either camp are aware of, or indeed wish to be aware of, the profound kinship of Christianity and Islam.
It is this as much as anything else that has made the delicate position of the contemporary eastern Christians increasingly untenable in recent years, as they find themselves awkwardly caught between their coreligionists in the west and their strong cultural links with their Muslims compatriots. Hence the vital importance of the popular syncretism which still exists at shrines such as Seidnaya and Cyrrhus.
The practice emphasises an important truth about the close affinity of the two great religions easily forgotten as the eastern Christians - the last surviving bridge between Islam and western Christianity - emigrate in reaction to the increasing hostility of the Islamic establishment.
Yet this kinship between the different religions of the book is something Muslim writers have been aware of for centuries. The 13th-century Sufi Jalal-ud Din Rumi, perhaps the greatest of all the mystical writers of Islam, lived in a town in central Anatolia in which the population was almost equally divided between Muslims, Christians and Jews. When he was asked about the relationship between these three apparently incompatible religions, he replied with the following story:
~Once upon a time, in a far-distant country somewhere north of Afghanistan, there was a city inhabited entirely by the blind. One day the news came that an elephant was passing outside the walls of the city.
"The citizens called a meeting and decided to send a delegation of three men outside the gates so that they could report back what an elephant was. In due course the three men left the town and stumbled forwards until they eventually found the elephant. The three reached out, felt the animal with their hands, then they all headed back to town as quickly as they could to report what they had felt. The first man said: 'An elephant is a marvellous creature! It is like a vast snake, but it can stand vertically upright in the air!' The second man was indignant at hearing this: 'What nonsense!' he said. 'I felt the elephant and what it most resembles is a pillar. It is firm and solid and however hard you push against it you could never knock it over.'
"The third man shook his head and said: 'Both these men are liars! I felt the elephant and it resembles a broad fan. It is wide and flat and leathery and when you shake it wobbles around like the sail of a dhow.'
"All three men stuck by their stories and for the rest of their lives refused to speak to each other. Each professed that they and only they knew the whole truth.
"Now of course all three of the blind men had a measure of insight. The first man felt the trunk of the elephant, the second the leg, the third the ear. All had been granted part of the truth, but not one of them had begun to grasp the totality or the greatness of the beast they had encountered. If only they had listened to one another and meditated on the different facets of the elephant, they might have grasped the true nature of the beast. But they were too proud and instead preferred to keep to their own half truths.
"So it is with us. We see Allah one way, the Jews have a slightly different conception, and the Christians have a third. To us, all our different visions are irreconcilable. But what we forget is that before God we are like blind men stumbling around in total darkness . . ."
This essay will be broadcast at 8pm
on 14 August on Radio 3's "The Flesh Made Word". William Dalrymple's award-winning
study of the decline of the Christian Middle East, "From the Holy Mountain",
is published by Flamingo ([pounds]8.99)