Title: Feminists, Welfare Reform, and Welfare Justice
Author: Mink, Gwendolyn
Source: Sojourner, 24(2):25-26, October 1998. ISSN: 0191-8699
Publisher: Soujourner Feminist Institute
The Personal Responsibility Act is the most aggressive invasion of women's
rights in this century, and most feminists did little to resist it. Many
feminists actually endorsed the new law's core principles--namely, that
poor single mothers should move from welfare to work and into financial
relationships with their children's fathers.
More than 95
percent of adult welfare recipients are women. This is not surprising,
since women are usually their families' caregivers. What is surprising
is that during two years of formal legislative debate about ending welfare,
the adverse consequences of such a decision for poor women were scarcely
mentioned. Even in liberal circles, where tears flowed prodigiously for
poor children, few rued the effects of punitive welfare provisions on poor
women.
To be sure,
the leaders of many women's and feminist organizations (ranging from the
American Association for University Women to the National Organization
for Women) did oppose punitive welfare reform--calling press conferences,
holding vigils, and even engaging in dramatic acts of civil disobedience.
But the millions of women who have made feminism a movement did not rally
around their leaders' cause. The Personal Responsibility Act is the most
aggressive invasion of women's rights in this century, and most feminists
did little to resist it. Many feminists actually endorsed the new law's
core principles--namely, that poor single mothers should move from welfare
to work and into financial relationships with their children's fathers.
Such feminists
collaborated with welfare reformers--either by their silence or in their
deeds. Mainly middle class and white, many with ties to the organized women's
movement, and some with high electoral positions, these feminists often
speak for all of feminism. When mobilized, they can wield impressive political
clout--enough to inspire an otherwise wishy-washy President Clinton to
hang tough on such knotty issues as late term abortion, for example. Resilient
and resourceful, these feminists have campaigned vigorously over the years--for
women candidates, against the Hyde Amendment, and for the Violence Against
Women Act. They have worked aggressively for women's rights and gender
justice, even when the' odds for success have been poor. Yet when it came
to welfare, they sat on their hands. Ignoring appeals from sister feminists
and welfare rights activists to defend "welfare as a women's issue" and
to oppose "the war against poor women" as if it were "a war against all
women," many even entered the war on the antiwelfare side.
Some examples:
on Capitol Hill, all white women in the U.S. Senate--including four Democratic
women who call themselves feminists--voted for the new .welfare law when
it first came to the Senate floor in the summer of 1995. In the House of
Representatives in 1996, 26 of 31 Democratic women, all of whom call themselves
feminists, voted for a Democratic welfare bill that would have stripped
recipients of their entitlement to welfare. Meanwhile, across the country,
a NOW-Legal Defense and Education Fund appeal for contributions to support
an economic justice litigator aroused so much hate mail that NOWLDEF stopped
doing direct mail on the welfare issue.
Feminist members
of Congress did not write the Personal Responsibility Act, of course. Nor
did members of the National Organization for Women or contributors to Emily's
List comprise the driving force behind the most brutal provisions of the
new welfare law. My claim is not that feminists were uniquely responsible
for how welfare has been reformed. My point is that they were uniquely
positioned to make a difference. They have made a difference in many arenas
across the years, even during inauspicious Republican presidencies--overturning
judicial evisceration of Title IX (in the Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1988), for example, and winning damage rights for women in discrimination
claims under Title VII (in the Civil Rights Act of 1991). They certainly
could have made a difference when a friendly Democratic president began
casting about for ways to reform welfare in 1993; and while they could
;not have changed Republican intentions in the 104th Congress, they surely
could have pressured the Democrat they helped elect to the White House
to veto the Republican bill.
But welfare
reform did not directly bear on the lives of most feminists, and did not
directly implicate their rights. The new welfare law did not threaten middle
class feminists' reproductive choices, or their sexual privacy, or their
right to raise their own children, or their occupational freedom. So they
did not raise their voices as they would have if, say, abortion rights
had been at stake. Solipsism induced silence among many feminists, giving
permission to policy-makers to treat punitive welfare reform as a no-lose
situation.
Silence among
feminists was not the only problem, however. At the same time feminists
were silent about the effects of new welfare provisions on poor women's
rights, they were quite vocal about the need to reform welfare so as to
improve the personal and family choices poor single mothers make. Many
feminists did, indeed, see that welfare is a women's issue--because almost
all adult recipients are mothers. But they also viewed welfare as an issue
for feminism: as a social policy that has promoted single mother's dependency
on government rather than independence in the labor market; that has discouraged
poor women from practicing fertility control; and that has compensated
for the sexual and paternal irresponsibility of individual men.
Without a doubt,
welfare never has been a feminist policy. Its goal never has been to enhance
women's independence or to honor women's choices. Benefits always have
been conditional and stigmatized, forcing poor mothers both to conform
to government's rules and to suffer suspicion that they cheat on those
rules. But while critiques of state patriarchy are common among academic
feminists, I don't think they are what lay behind most feminists' reservations
about defending poor women's entitlement to welfare.
During the welfare
debate, most feminists focused on the deficiencies of welfare mothers,
rather than on the deficiencies of the welfare system. They trafficked
in the tropes of "illegitimacy," and "pathology," and "dependency," and
"irresponsibility," much as did conservative male politicians in both parties.
But kinder and gentler than the men who repealed welfare, they viewed mothers
who need welfare as mothers who need feminism, not punishment. They saw
welfare mothers as victims--of patriarchy, maybe of racism, possibly of
false consciousness. However, they didn't see welfare mothers as agents
of their own lives--as women who are entitled to and capable of making
independent and honorable choices about what kind of work they will do
and how many children they will have and whether they will marry. If anything,
many feminists agreed with conservatives that welfare mothers do not make
good choices.
Feminist reservations
about welfare mothers' choices strengthened the bipartisan consensus that
there's something wrong with mothers who need welfare and that cash assistance
should require their reform. The two pillars of the new welfare law--work
and marriage--were born from this consensus. The harshness of the law's
work requirements and the brutality of its sanctions against nonmarital
childrearing may be Republican and patriarchal in execution. But the law's
emphasis on women's labor market participation and on men's participation
in families were Democratic and feminist in inspiration.
With feminist
complicity, the new welfare law--the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996--hardens
legal differences among women based on their marital, maternal, class,
and racial statuses. It segregates poor single mothers into a separate
caste, subject to a separate system of law. While middle class women may
choose to participate in the labor market, poor single mothers are forced
by law to do so (work requirements and time limits). While middle class
women may choose to bear children, poor single mothers may be punished
by government for making that choice (the family cap and illegitimacy ratios).
While middle class women enjoy still-strong rights to sexual and reproductive
privacy, poor single mothers are compelled by government to reveal the
details of intimate relationships in exchange for survival (mandatory maternal
cooperation in establishing paternity). And while middle class mothers
may choose their children's fathers by marrying them or permitting them
to develop relationships with children--or not--poor single mothers are
required by law to make room for biological fathers in their families (mandatory
maternal cooperation in establishing and enforcing child support orders).
FEMINIST THEMES IN THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
Feminists contributed to this new welfare regime in two major ways:
first, in their emphasis on work outside the home; and second, in their
insistence on "making fathers pay."
Although there
is plenty of evidence that women in general and feminists in particular
don't like the draconian aspects of the new welfare law, they do not necessarily
eschew the law's basic assumptions. One assumption is that poor single
mothers should move from welfare to work.
Feminists did
not invent the "work" solution to welfare. But their emphasis on women's
right to work outside the home--in tandem with women's increased presence
in the labor force--gave cover to conservatives eager to require wage-work
of single mothers even as they championed the traditional family. Moreover,
it legitimated a view popular among many feminists--that wage-earning is
"good for" mothers who need welfare.
Most of the
policy claims made by second wave feminists have emphasized women's right
to be equal to men in men's world--to be leaders and breadwinners, too.
The white and middle class women who rekindled feminism in the 1960s responded
to their particular historical experiences, experiences drawn by an ethos
of domesticity which had confined middle class white women to the home
and which had used such women's domesticity to justify their inequality.
Middle class feminists understandably spurned the domesticity they had
been assigned and keyed on work outside the home as a defining element
of women's full and equal citizenship.
As they entered
the labor market, these women did not spurn family work; rather, they found
their energy doubly taxed by the dual responsibility of earning and caring.
Accordingly, many feminists called for labor market policies addressing
the family needs that fall disproportionately on women--parental leave
and child care policies, for example. Their concern has been to ease the
contradictions between wage-work and family life. Their focus has been
how family needs impede opportunities and achievements in the labor market;
their goals have been labor policies that relieve women's family responsibilities
(e.g., child care) and strengthen women's rights in the workplace (e.g.,
wage equity). They have not been so interested in winning social policies
to support women where we meet our family responsibilities: in the home.
The popular
feminist claim that women earn independence, autonomy, and equality through
wages historically has divided feminists along class and race lines, as
women of color and poor white women have not usually earned equality from
sweated labor. To the contrary. Especially for women of color, wage work
has been a mark of inequality: expected by the white society for whom they
work; necessary because their male kin cannot find jobs or cannot earn
family-supporting wages; and exploitative because their earnings keep them
poor. Thus, the right to care for their own children--to work inside the
home--has been a touchstone goal of their struggles for equality. The fact
that women are positioned divergently in the nexus among care-giving, wage-earning,
and inequality separated feminists one from another on the welfare issue;
separated many white feminists from many feminists of color; and separated
employed middle class feminists from mothers who need welfare.
Out of second-wave
feminisms' emphasis on winning rights in the workplace emerged, sotto voce,
a feminist expectation that women ought to work outside the home and an
assumption that any job outside the home--including caring for other people's
children--is more socially productive than caring for one's own. Although
feminism is fundamentally about winning women choices, our labor market
bias has put much of feminism not on the side of vocational choice--the
choice to work inside or outside the home--but on the side of wage-earning
for all women. Thus, most congressional feminists, along with many feminists
across the country, have conflated their right to work outside the home
with poor single mothers' obligation to do so. Thus many feminists agreed
with Bill Clinton and the Republicans that poor single mothers should "move
from welfare to work."
The labor market focus of second wave feminism has accomplished much for
women--most importantly establishing equality claims for women as wage-earners.
Contemporary feminist calls for further labor market reforms--for an increased
minimum wage, gender-sensitive unemployment insurance, comparable worth,
child care--rightly point out the persisting impediments to women's equality
as labor market citizens. The problem is not with the specific content
of feminist agendas but with their one-sidedness and prescriptivity.
Many feminists
have worked ardently to attenuate the new welfare law's harshest provisions.
For example, NOW-LDEF, working especially with Lucille Roybal-Allard in
the U.S. House and Patti Murray in the U.S. Senate, has fought hard to
exempt battered women from some of the new welfare rules. This initiative,
along with Patsy Mink's efforts in the U.S. House to secure vocational
education funds for single mothers and grassroots struggles to enforce
fair labor standards in welfare mothers' jobs, could improve some women's
fate in the new welfare system. But feminists' attempts to mitigate disaster
do not disturb the principles behind the new welfare law: they do not refute
the idea that poor single mothers should seek work outside the home. Except
among welfare rights activists and a handful of feminists, no one has defended
poor mothers' right to raise their children, and no one has questioned
the proposition that poor single mothers should have to--should be compelled
by law to--work outside the home.
Feminists' enlistment
in work-ethical welfare reform reflected their gender goals and biases.
In the welfare context, these goals and biases have racial effects. Although
work requirements aim indiscriminately at all poor single mothers, it is
mothers of color who bear their heaviest weight. African American and Latina
mothers are disproportionately poor, and, accordingly, are disproportionately
enrolled on welfare: in 1994, adult recipients in AFDC families were 37.4
percent white, 36.4 percent Black, 19.9 percent Latina, 2.9 percent Asian,
and 1.3 percent Native American. So when welfare rules indenture poor mothers
as unpaid servants of local governments (in workfare programs), it is mothers
of color who are disproportionately harmed. And when time limits require
poor mothers to forsake their children for the labor market, it is mothers
of color who are disproportionately deprived of their right to manage their
family's lives and it is children of color who are disproportionately deprived
of their mothers' care.
Feminists' view
that labor market participation is good for women skewed discussions of
single mothers' poverty and raised the costs of care-giving, especially
for mothers who are poor and of color. At the same time, feminists' view
that tough child support enforcement is good for mothers and children raised
the costs of childbearing and childraising for mothers who are poor and
never married.
Feminists in
Congress have been particularly emphatic about "making fathers pay" for
children through increased federal involvement in the establishment and
enforcement of child support orders. In fact, without white, middle-class
feminist interventions, especially in the House of Representatives, paternity-based
child support would not be the major pillar of the new welfare policy that
it has become. The only reason the Personal Responsibility Act contains
child support provisions is because feminists in Congress embarrassed Republicans
into adopting them.
The child support
provisions impose stringent national conditions on nonmarital childrearing
by poor women. The first condition is the mandatory establishment of paternity.
Welfare law stipulates that a mother's eligibility for welfare depends
upon her willingness to reveal the identity of her child's father. Since
the purpose of paternity establishment is to assign child support obligations
to biological fathers, the second condition is that mothers who need welfare
must cooperate in establishing, modifying, and enforcing the support orders
for their children. The law requires states to reduce a family's welfare
grant by at least 25 percent when a mother fails to comply with these rules
and permits states to deny the family's grant altogether.
The view that
the dereliction of fathers creates or feeds mothers' need for welfare is
quite popular among middle class feminists. Finding the costs of childbearing
that fall disproportionately on women a wellspring of gender inequality,
many feminists want men to provide for their biological children, even
if they have no relationship with them. Incautious pursuit of this objective
aligned middle class feminists behind a policy that endangers the rights
of poor single mothers.
Paternity establishment
rules compel nonmarital mothers to disclose private matters in exchange
for cash and medical assistance--to answer questions like whom did you
sleep with? How often? When? Where? How? Meanwhile, child support rules
require nonmarital mothers to associate with biological fathers, and in
so doing to stoke such fathers' claims to parental rights. In these and
other ways, paternity establishment and child support provisions set poor
single mothers apart from other mothers, subjecting them to stringent legal
requirements because of their class and marital status. While they beef
up services that deserted middle class mothers may choose to enlist, they
impose such services on--and compel intimate revelations from--poor mothers
who have chosen to parent alone.
Middle class
feminist energy behind vigorous paternity establishment and child support
enforcement is no doubt animated in part by exasperation with some men's
cost-free exploitation of the sexual revolution. From this perspective,
men ought to be held responsible for the procreative consequences of their
heightened access to women's bodies. The quest for fairness in procreative
relations drives the increasingly punitive proposals designed to force
fathers to meet their obligations to children. But it doesn't explain why
middle class feminists believe maternal coercion is an acceptable means
to paternal responsibility.
A reading of
congressional debates suggests that the main impetus behind middle class
feminists' advocacy of punitive paternity establishment and child support
enforcement rules are their own class and marital experiences. When middle
class women think of the circumstances that might lead them to welfare,
they think of divorce--from middle class men who then refuse to chip in
for the care and maintenance of children. California Congresswoman Lynn
Woolsey is a case in point. Something of a Beltway icon during the welfare
debate, she described herself and was described by others as "a typical
welfare mother." Thirty years earlier, she had had to turn to welfare following
her divorce from a man she describes as "very successful." Though she had
a support order, she "never received a penny in child support." Woolsey's
story provided a useful strategic intervention into the welfare debate,
countering the stereotypic image of welfare mothers as Black and unmarried.
But marking one mother's story, however uplifting, as representative of
a whole population invites the kind of solipsism that produces one-size-fits-all
policy prescriptions. Such prescriptions are not only unworkable, they
also neglect the needs of people who must and do live their lives differently.
The compulsory
features of paternity establishment and child support enforcement may be
unremarkable to a divorced mother with a support order: she escapes compulsion
by choosing to pursue child support, and what matters to her is that the
support order be enforced. But some mothers do not have support orders
because they do not want them. A mother may not want to identify her child's
father because she may fear abuse for herself or her child. She may not
want to seek child support because she has chosen to parent alone--or with
someone else. She may know her child's father is poor and may fear exposing
him to harsh penalties when he cannot pay what a court tells him he owes.
She may consider his emotional support for his child to be worth more than
the $100 the state might collect and that she will never see.
"Making fathers
pay" may promote the economic and justice interests of many custodial mothers.
But making mothers make fathers pay means making mothers pay for subsistence
with their own rights--and safety. The issue is not whether government
should assist mothers in collecting payments from fathers. Of course it
should. Neither is the issue whether child support enforcement provisions
in welfare policy help mothers who have or desire child support awards.
Of course they do. Nor is the issue whether it is a good thing for children
to have active fathers--of course it can be. The issue is coercion, coercion
directed toward the mother who has eschewed patriarchal conventions--whether
by choice or from necessity. It is also coercion directed toward the mother
whose deviation from patriarchal norms has been linked to her racial and
cultural standing.
Paternity establishment
and child support became strategies for welfare reform not because of the
unjust effects of divorce on mothers but because of the allegedly unsavory
behavior of mothers of nonmarital children. It is nonmarital childbearing,
not divorce, that has been blamed for social pathologies like crime and
dependency. The preamble to the new welfare law legislates precisely this
point of view. Such patriarchal reasoning leaches into racial argument,
as welfare discourse specifically correlates nonmarital childbearing rates
among African Americans with social and moral decay.
Like work requirements,
the coercive aspects of paternity establishment and child support policy
are aimed against single mothers in general. However, like work requirements,
they have decidedly racial effects. The mandatory maternal cooperation
rule targets mothers who are not and have not been married, as well as
mothers who do not have and do not want child support. Nonmarital mothers
are the bulls-eye, and among nonmarital mothers receiving welfare, only
28.4 percent are white. This means that the new welfare law's invasions
of associational and privacy rights will disproportionately harm mothers
of colon Inspired by white feminist outrage against middle class "deadbeat
dads," the paternity establishment and child support provisions both reflect
and entrench inequalities among women.
SHOULD FEMINISTS DEFEND WELFARE?
How might feminists have intervened differently in the welfare debate?
We could have begun with the feminist method with listening to welfare
mothers' stories rather than inferring from our own. And we could have
begun by defending poor mothers' rights as we would defend our own--by
resisting reforms that coerce poor mothers to surrender rights in exchange
for cash assistance and that make poor mothers' choices for them.
We did, indeed,
need to end welfare--but as poor single mothers knew it, not as middle
class moralizers imagined it. Why we end welfare dictates how we end it--whether
we end it by subordinating poor single mothers or by improving their prospects
for equality.
What kind of
social policy would enable poor single mothers' equality? During the welfare
debate, feminists who did mobilize against punitive reforms found common
ground in opposition to the initiatives proposed by the Republicans, as
well as to some proposed by President Clinton. But we were far from united
behind a common vision of welfare justice. While we could all agree on
the urgency of child care and health care and jobs, we were less certain
about what social policy should say to single mothers who want to or need
to care for their own children in their own homes. That we were collectively
ambivalent about social policy toward care-giving didn't matter during
the welfare debate, for the terms of debate were so narrow. No one was
asking "what should welfare be for?" or "how might welfare work for women?"
Although it doesn't look like these questions will soon be ripe, feminists
must push and prepare for the day when they will be.
Toward that
end, I offer my own assessment, one based on ten years of welfare research
and welfare activism. In my view, welfare is not only a survival issue
for poor families, it is an equality issue for poor mothers. It is an equality
issue because the assumptions and prescriptions embedded in welfare law
and rife in the welfare debate disable poor mothers' independent citizenship.
Equality requires us to repudiate the existing basis of welfare, which
we can do most effectively by establishing a new one--namely, that poor
single women who give care to their children are mothers whose care-giving
is work.
We all know
that family work--household management and parenting--takes skill, energy,
time and responsibility. We know this because people who can afford it
pay other people to do this work. Many wage-earning mothers pay for child
care; upper class mothers who work outside the home pay for nannies; very
wealthy mothers who don't even work outside the home pay household workers
to assist them with their various tasks. Moreover, even when we are not
paying surrogates to do our family care-giving, we pay people to perform
activities in the labor market that care-givers also do in the home. We
pay drivers to take us places; we pay nurses to make us feel better and
help us get well; we pay psychologists to help us with our troubles; we
pay teachers to explain our lessons; we pay cooks and waitresses to prepare
and serve our food.
If economists
can measure the value of this work when it is performed for other people's
families, why can't we impute value to it when it is performed for one's
own? In 1972, economists at the Chase Manhattan Bank did just that, translating
family care-giving work into its labor market components--nursemaid, dietitian,
cook, laundress, maintenance man, chauffeur, food buyer, cook, dishwasher,
seamstress, practical nurse, gardener. The economists concluded that the
weekly value of family care-givers' work was at least $257.53 or $13,391.56
a year (1972 dollars). Had poor single mothers received welfare benefits
in 1996 at even 1972 values for care-giving work, they would have had incomes
above the poverty line! And had their benefits explicitly compensated them
for the work that they do, poor single mothers would not have had to live
under the stigma of "welfare dependency."
Once we establish that all care-giving is work--whatever the racial, marital,
or class status of the care-giver and whether or not it is performed in
the labor market--we can build a case for economic arrangements that enable
poor single mothers to do their jobs. In place of stingy benefits doled
out begrudgingly to needy mothers, welfare would become an income owed
to non-market, care-giving workers--owed to anyone who bears sole responsibility
for children (or for other dependent family members).
We could model
this income on survivors' insurance, which, since 1939, has supported widowed
mothers who work inside the home raising their children. More generous
than welfare, survivors' insurance is free from stigma and social controls.
It is nationally uniform and paid automatically to widows (or care-giving
widowers) and minor children of deceased workers covered by the Social
Security Act. Mothers who are eligible for survivor's insurance do not
have to submit to governmental scrutiny in order to receive benefits, and
do not have to live by government's moral and cultural rules. Survivors'
insurance gives widowed mothers the means to make their own choices about
care-giving and wage-earning. It designates care-giving as a socially necessary
and valuable activity, deserving of social assistance.
All family care-givers
are owed an income in theory, for all care-giving is work. However, a caregiver's
income should redistribute resources to mothers without means, for their
capacity to sustain families and to make independent choices hangs on their
ability to provide. The cardinal purpose of such an income should be to
redress the unique inequality of solo care-givers--usually mothers --who
shoulder the dual responsibilities of providing care for children and financing
it. While some single mothers may be able to afford both responsibilities,
most cannot, because they are time-poor, cash-poor, or both. A care-giver's
income would relieve the disproportionate burdens that fall on single mothers
and in so doing would lessen inequalities among women based on class and
marital status, and between male and female parents based on default social
roles. But although paid to single care-givers only, this income support
should be universally guaranteed, assuring a safety net to all care-givers
if ever they need or choose to parent--or to care for other family members-alone.
The extension of the safety net to care-givers as independent citizens
would promote equality, as it would enable adults to exit untenable--and
often violent--relationships of economic dependency and to retain reproductive
and vocational choices when they do.
We need to end
welfare in this way to enable equality--in the safety net, between the
genders, among women, and under the Constitution. Income support for all
care-givers who are going it alone would permit solo parents to decide
how best to manage their responsibilities to children. It might even undermine
the sexual division of labor, for some men will be enticed to do family
care-giving work once they understand it to have economic value. Offering
an income to all solo care-givers in a unitary system--to nonmarital mothers
as well as to widowed ones--would erase invidious moral distinctions among
mothers and eliminate their racial effects. Further, universal income support
for single parents would restore mothers' constitutional rights--to not
marry, to bear children, and to parent them, even if they are poor. It
would promote occupational freedom, by rewarding work even when work cannot
be exchanged for wages. So redefined, welfare would become a sign not of
dependency but of independence, a means not to moral regulation but to
social and political equality.
Ending welfare
this way will remedy inequality where it is most gendered--in the care-giving
relations of social reproduction. Yet, it will not be enough to end welfare
by replacing it with a caregivers' income. The end of welfare--the goal
of feminist social policy--must be to enhance women's choices across their
full spectrum. We need to improve women's opportunities as both non-market
and market workers, so that caregivers' choice to work inside the home
is backed up by the possibility of choosing not to. Middle class feminists
were right to reject ascribed domesticity, and they have taught us well
that fully independent and equal citizenship for women entails having the
right not to care. So we must also win labor market reforms to make outside
work feasible even for mothers who are parenting alone. Unless we make
outside work affordable for solo care-givers, a care-givers' income would
constrain choice by favoring caregiving over wage-earning.
The end of welfare,
then, includes "making work pay," not only by remunerating care-giving
work but also by making participation in the labor market equitable and
rewarding for women, especially mothers. To make work pay we must improve
women's position in the labor market: through a minimum wage that provides
an income at least at the poverty threshold; comparable worth policies
that correct the low economic value assigned to women's jobs; unemployment
insurance reforms covering women's gendered reasons for losing or leaving
jobs; paid family leave; guaranteed child care; universal health care;
full employment policy; a massive investment
in education and vocational training; and aggressive enforcement of antidiscrimination
laws.
This end to
welfare will take us clown many paths, in recognition of women's diverse
experiences of gender and diverse hopes for equality.
This article
originally appeared in Social Justice, vol. 25, n.1
Gwendolyn Mink is Professor of Politics at the University of California,
Santa Cruz. She is the author of Welfare's End (1998) and The Wages of
Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (1995), which won
the 1996 Victoria Schuck Award for the best book on women and politics
from the American Political Science Association.
Copyright © 1998, Sojourner Feminist Institute